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The Supreme Court and the Profession of Law
ELLIOTT E. CHEATHAM*
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES in its original seven Articles has no
mention of lawyers. The twenty-four Amendments to the Constitution con-
tain only one reference to lawyers, that in the Sixth Amendment on the right
to the assistance of counsel in criminal cases. The federal statutes on the pro-
fession of law are few and fragmentary. The guiding source drawn on by the
Supreme Court in its decisions on the profession of law is its image of the
American lawyer. This image is derived by the justices from their conception
of the role of lawyers in our social order and the relation of the profession of
law to the other elements of our society.
Law is the chief instrument of government. Lawyers have the chief part in
employing and shaping this instrument. The standards of the profession of
law-its structure, its choice of personnel, its guiding principles in action,
even its tone-are of high public importance. In our times, when scientific
developments and political ideologies have speeded social change, the stand-
ards need re-examination to help insure that the profession is best serving its
social functions.
In the development of its standards a profession is apt to look inward and
backward and to see most clearly its own needs and desires with lesser atten-
tion to the interests of the rest of society which it exists to serve. President
Franklin Roosevelt made the point well in an address to the graduating class
at West Point:'
"... those who enter into a profession, military or civilian, must eternally keep
before their eyes the practical relationship of their own profession to the rights,
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Charles Evans Hughes Emeritus Professor of
Law, Columbia University.
1 N. Y. Times, June 13, 1935, p. 15.
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the hopes and the needs of the whole body of citizens who make up the nation.
One of the most difficult tasks of government today is to avoid the aggrandize-
ment of any one group and to keep the main objective of the general good clear
and unimpaired."
It is the purpose of this paper to consider some aspects of the influence of
the Supreme Court of the United States on the standards of the profession.
The profession of law operates within two larger systems, the economic
and the political systems. On the power of government over the two systems
the Court has developed contrasting principles. As to the economic system
the Court has come to allow to government wide powers of control and even
direction, with the old slogans of freedom of contract and sanctity of prop-
erty rights giving way before the increasing needs of social control. As to the
political system by contrast the Court has insisted on individual liberties
without restraints or limitations on the competition of ideas. These liberties
in our pluralistic society are threatened by the growth of great centers of
power, big government, big business, big labor and even big profession. The
contrasting attitude of the Court toward regulation of the economic and po-
litical systems may be explained in Professor Berle's words "through an
evolving consensus that insists equally on enjoying the results of mass pro-
duction and on the primacy of individual life." 2
Recognizing that lawyers are essential to the protection of the individual
against these centers of power as well as against other individuals, the Court
has come to consider the standards of the profession within the larger context
of our democratic society. The action of the Court as to four aspects of pro-
fessional standards will be discussed briefly. One is a structure of the profes-
sion that will make legal services available to those who need them. Another
is the method of choice and control of the personnel of the profession that
will help to assure liberty of thought and of action. The third is the prin-
ciples of conduct that guide the members of the profession in their work. The
last is public leadership.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND His AVAILABILITY
Criminal cases. The legal right to have effective counsel furnished in crimi-
nal cases has been made clear in three decisions. These decisions have been
so thoroughly discussed by others that I may deal with them briefly.3 The
2 Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1965).
8 The three cases are Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Numerous subsidiary but important
questions remain. For example, how serious or of what nature must the accusation be to
bring the case within the requirement of counsel, say a traffic violation or a charge of juve-
nile delinquency; how early and how late shall counsel be provided; before or at arraign-
ment and throughout post-conviction proceedings including attacks in the federal courts on
1965]
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first decision declared the right in exceptional circumstances in the state
courts; the second affirmed the right in all cases in the federal courts; the last
extended the right to ordinary cases in the state courts.4
The bar has had a noteworthy share in these developments. In all three of
the cases the counsel representing the accused in the Supreme Court served
out of a sense of professional responsibility. In the culminating case the at-
torneys general of over twenty states joined in a brief as amici curiae in sup-
port of the right. Even before the decision came down the American Bar
Foundation had undertaken a thorough study of the methods of providing
counsel. With the aid of cooperating committees from all fifty states
the foundation extended its inquiry throughout the country, and its findings
reveal both deficiencies that need correction and methods that may serve as
models.
Civil Cases. The bearing of the Constitution on the provision of counsel in
civil matters is quite a different story. It has only begun to unfold through
two cases that were about as unpromising as could be found for so import-
ant a matter, National Association of Colored People v. Button5 and Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia.6
The Button case arose from efforts by the State of Virginia to block the
NAACP from encouraging and conducting through its legal staff litigation
directed against racial segregation. The state had enacted statutes which,
though clearly aimed at the NAACP, were general in terms and embodied a
centuries old prohibition against the stirring up and conduct of litigation by
outsiders. The decision of the Supreme Court, which barred the application
of the statute to the NAACP, could have been rested simply on the ground
urged by the Association that it was engaged only in protecting political
rights or on the correlative nature of Virginia's action stated in Mr. Justice
Douglas's concurring opinion as a thinly veiled part of Virginia's "massive
resistance" to the law of the land. Instead Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for
the majority, placed the decision on the much broader ground of freedoms of
association and expression with all the consequences these rights may en-
compass.
The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen case concerned a plan of the
union to aid its members and their families in obtaining redress for acci-
state court judgments and applications for parole or pardon; when is counsel so lacking in
ability or loyalty or courage that his aid is inadequate; what additional aids shall be pro-
vided, as, investigators, expert witnesses, transcripts of record?
The cases are considered in the context of the development of the due process clause and
of the approach to law by the French Institutionalist jurists in Broderick, Reflection on the
Right to Counsel and the Adamson Dissent, 13 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 95 (1964).
s371 U.S. 415 (1963).377 U.S. 1 (1964).
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dents during employment. The part of the plan involved in the case called
for the designation by the Brotherhood of selected lawyers in sixteen dis-
tricts covering the country whom the Brotherhood would promptly and
strongly recommend to its members, with the resultant channeling of cases
to these lawyers. This was certainly not an area that called for special meas-
ures to insure the availability of counsel. For the protection given by the
Federal Employers' Liability Act is the most extensive given to any work-
men, these employees are alert in understanding and protecting their rights,
and the breadth of liability without limitation on recovery make the cases
most attractive to many lawyers. Yet the Court relying on the guarantees of
free speech, petition and assembly upheld the plan against condemnation,
as it stated, by the common law, the Canons of Ethics of the profession, and
Virginia statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.
It would not be useful for my purpose to analyze the two cases in detail.
The most unpromising nature of the cases for the purposes for which they
were used reveals the depth of the dissatisfaction of the Court with the exist-
ing methods of legal services for some of our people. It demonstrates as well
the strength of conviction within the Court that the existing standards of the
bar must not stand rigidly in the way of the development of new mehods. It
will be helpful to try to understand the Court's methods in employing the
cases as it did, to perceive the reasons for the decisions and, most important-
ly, to take note of the opportunities they open before the bar. In two sur-
prising bounds the Court has leaped a long way forward in giving the pro-
tection of the Constitution to new methods of providing legal services.
In developing the law courts cannot create the cases they would like to de-
cide. They must make do with the cases brought their way. However, they
can employ devices to foster development. So in the Button case Mr. Justice
Brennan, like a pretty girl dropping her handkerchief to encourage further
advances, dropped a broad question as to the validity of earlier state deci-
sions that condemned the furnishing of legal services by corporate interme-
diaries. Citing these cases he said: 7
"We intimate no view one way or the other as to the merits of those decisions ......
In the Brotherhood case Mr. Justice Black transformed the Button decision
into something beyond its scope and, as Mr. Justice Brennan with his ques-
tion, intimated that the protection of the Constitution may extend much be-
yond the methods involved in them.8
"It is interesting to note that in Great Britain unions do not simply recommend
lawyers to members in need of advice; they retain counsel, paid by the union,
371 U.S. at 442.
8 377 U.S. at 7.
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to represent members in personal lawsuits, a practice similar to that which we
upheld in N. A. A. C. P. v. Button, supra."
The two cases are excellent illustrations of the creative nature of the judicial
process.
In reaching the results it did the Court was given unintended aid by the
opponents of the plans. The counsel for Virginia in the Button case were un-
willing even to suggest in argument that the state's "interposition" or "mas-
sive resistance" could stand for an instant against the supreme law of the
land. So they based their defense on the supposed professional and legal con-
demnation of corporations which as "lay intermediaries" placed between
lawyers and clients provide legal services to those in need, and counsel ar-
gued that the NAACP was such a corporation. It was this defense which,
though rejected by the Court, furnished Mr. Justice Brennan the opportu-
nity for his far-reaching question and intimation. In the Brotherhood case
the unintended aid was given by a ruling of the Committee on Unauthorized
Practice of Law of the American Bar Association that legal services could not
be provided as fringe benefits either by a corporation to its employees or by a
labor union to its members. Though the ruling was not explicitly mentioned
in either opinion the justices evidently had it much in mind, for in both
opinions the Court cited a passage in the leading work on legal ethics in
which the long-time chairman of the bar association's Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics had expressed his strong disagreement with the ruling.9 So Vir-
ginia's "massive resistance" to integration and the adamant opposition of a
bar committee to group legal services contributed much to these develop-
ments.
The two civil cases discussed differ from the three key criminal cases on
the right to counsel in several respects. The substantial unanimity within
the Court on legal representation in criminal cases has not carried over to
the civil cases. In both of the latter cases there were vigorous dissents, by Mr.
Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Clark, who expressed grave concern over the
threat of the decisions to the standards of the bar. The organized bar, too,
which had welcomed the results in the criminal cases, opposed the decisions
in the civil case.
In the Brotherhood case the American Bar Association first vainly sought
'"Much could be said in favor of the propriety as well as the practical wisdom of permit-
ting a corporation to furnish, as part of its contract of employment, legal services to its em-
ployees where this is for the benefit of the corporation, where the relation between the lawyer
and the employee is direct and no conflict of interest exists between the employer and the
employee.... It is not believed that the Canon will prevent the labor unions from finding
lawyers to advise their members. The whole modern tendency is in favor of such arrange-
ments, including particularly employer and cooperative health services, the principles of
which, if applied to legal services would materially lower and spread the total cost to the
lower income groups." DRINKER, LEGAL ETmics 164, 167 (1953).
[Vol. XIV
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permission to appear as amicus curiae and after the decision joined with
most of the State bar associations in supporting a motion for a rehearing,
which was also denied. Furthermore, the direction of the Court's decisions
differ widely in the two sets of cases. In the criminal cases the holdings were
in the affirmative that counsel for the accused must be provided, by the state
itself if need be. In the civil cases the holdings merely protected private
methods of providing counsel and thus forced the bar to reconsider the meth-
ods of making legal services available.
This century has seen notable advances by the bar in effective services to
some segments of society. The rise of the large corporation law firm has been
explained as the response of the bar to the needs of its clients.10 The develop-
ment of specialization is a similar response." Closer to the situations in the
two Supreme Court cases is the recent use of lawyer referral service for the
more alert of the middle classes, and the continuing development of legal
aid for the poor. Of the last Mr. Justice Potter Stewart has said:' 2
"The quest for equal justice under law for those who cannot pay for the legal
help they need will continue to demand unceasing and many-sided effort."
Yet it must be admitted that the bar has not shown all the imagination
and initiative needed in developing new methods. If the bar had shown these
qualities the Button and Brotherhood cases, we may guess, would never have
been decided. The unfortunate fact remains that there are large segments of
our people who do not obtain the legal services they need and who, as ample
experience shows, will not obtain them except through the development of
new methods of providing them. An accompanying fact is that those of our
people who do not obtain the legal services they need are not all alike. Some
of them are well off enough to pay for the services, if the services are rendered
for moderate fees through agencies the clients trust. It is with this great mid-
dle class of the population with which the Brotherhood case, in its intima-
tion rather than its decision, dealt. Others of our people are too poor to pay
anything substantial, or are even so handicapped in life they are functional-
ly incompetent to protect themselves in our complex society without affirma-
tive help.13 It is with them that the Button case dealt. The Brotherhood case
has caused the greater discussion by the bar, for it concerned the kind of
10 "The instance of the large law firm handling the problems of its clients, and particularly
those created by big government and big labor, is an outstanding response to the demands of
clients for the best possible service." TWEED, THE CHANGING PRACTICE OF LAW 15 (1955).
U See CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED, Chap. 5 (1963).
12See Brownell, A Decade of Progress; Legal Aid and Defender Services, 47 A.B.A.J.
867,870 (1961).
23 See Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 361 (1965);
Clarlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1965).
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cases with which the bar is familiar. The Button case, however, has the larger
potential, for it deals with the functionally incompetent who have been al-
most ignored by us.1 4 The new methods for making legal services available
will have to vary in their nature to achieve their purpose.
In the reconsideration and development of new methods there is public
need for the same imagination and initiative that the bar has shown in deal-
ing with its good clients. If the bar does not act, the void will be filled by shy-
sters and sharpers. There is need, too, for the maintenance of such profes-
sional standards as those that call for competence and that condemn the rep-
resentation of conflicting interests. The opportunity is a most appropriate
one for the bar. It is of the essence . the lawyer's work to turn vague values
and ideas into workable plans and programs.
In the two cases discussed the Court did not deny the power of regulation
by the state or by the profession. The Court did insist that regulation meet
the test of public interest, and seemingly it laid on those who would support
a regulation the burden of showing that it meets this test. In the Button case
Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion struck down the regulation because' 5
"the State has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form
of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities, which can justfy the broad
prohibitions which it has imposed."
In the Brotherhood case Mr. Justice Black, after quoting this language of
Mr. Justice Brennan, continued with the same idea saying, 16
"In the present case the State agan has failed to show any appreciable public
interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan .. "
The best expression of the idea, because it is put in the affirmative form of
the basic duty of the bar, is by Mr. Justice (now Mr. Chief Justice) Traynor
of California who in a dissenting opinion years earlier would have upheld
the Brotherhood plan because as he said: 17
"Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public, the rules
it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be directed at the performance
of that duty."
In sum, the two cases have read into the law the moral right of availability
of counsel. The Court made the standards of the bar confront the inade-
Cahn & Cahn, War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L. J. 1317 (1964).
"371 U.S. at 444.
10377 U.S. at 8.
17 Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
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quacy of its methods in making counsel available in fact. In that confronta-
tion, "solicitation of practice," "lay intermediaries" and other such ideas
developed for ordinary cases dropped away. It is this return to the funda-
mental right to counsel in fact that is the essence of the decisions. The Court
has done here what is needed in changing times throughout the law. It has
tested the rules of law by the ends which it is the function of the rules
to serve.
Despite the early hostile attitude toward the Brotherhood case there have
already been several affirmative responses to the needs and more are in the
making. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorizes the Attorney General of the
United States to institute actions for the protection of some civil rights of
persons unable to carry on appropriate legal proceedings, the situation to
which the NAACP had directed itself in the Button case.' 8 The Criminal
Justice Act of 1964 deals with the "adequate representation of defendants"
in criminal cases in the federal courts.1 9 Earlier representatives of the organ-
ized bar had been active. Before the Gideon case the American Bar
Foundation, as mentioned above, had initiated a searching inquiry into meth-
ods of providing counsel in criminal cases. 20 Several years before the Button
and Brotherhood cases the State Bar of California had begun a long continued
inquiry into the desirability of group practice of law and the progress re-
port of its special committee in 1964 is the best study so far.21 The Committee
on Lawyer Referral Service of the American Bar Association has this year
proposed a still wider inquiry into the methods of making legal services
available in fact to all of our people. And President Powell in a statement to
the American Bar Association concluded:
"more effective means of distributing legal services must be devised.... the
organized Bar must explore broadly, and with an open mind, the possibility of
other solutions."
The breadth and openness of mind that may be called for are indicated by a
conference of social workers and lawyers at which Attorney General Katzen-
bach, speaking of the twenty percent of our population "serving a life sen-
tence of poverty", said: 22
To be sure these are not new problems. It is our appreciation of them that is
's Public Law 88-342, 88th Cong., H.R. 7152, July 2, 1964.
a 18 U.S.C. §3006A, Public Law 88-455, 88th Cong., S. 1057, Aug. 20, 1964.
2 SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CAsEs-A FIELD STUDY OF THE PRACTICE IN
AMERICAN STATE COURTS.
2139 J. STATE BAR CAL. 639 (1964).
21 Conference Proceedings, The Extension of Legal Services to the Poor, Sponsored by U.S.
Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, pp. 10, 11 (1964).
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new ..... There must be new techniques, new services, and new forms of inter-
professional cooperation to match our new interest.
The subject of providing legal services should not be left without mention
at least of a method whose distinctiveness is obscured by our familiariy with
it. It is the use of contingent fees. It is, as a writer recently reminded us,23
"a uniquely American development which has evolved in the fact of an historical
position (still held by most countries) that its use is contrary to the public inter-
est, unprofessional, and even criminal."
In this country the services of the plaintiff's counsel in the great bulk of cases
in the courts of general jurisdiction and even before many administrative
tribunals are financed through contingent fees paid out of the amounts re-
covered. The usefulness of contingent fees, the dangers inherent in them and
desirable limitations, and possible alternatives in providing legal services
make a story all their own, which has been excellently told elsewhere. 24 It is
enough here to say that the Supreme Court early and almost casually gave its
approval to such fees.2 5
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE LAWYER
An essential quality of the lawyer is independence. He must be independent
of the tribunal before which he appears and independent of the social pres-
sures which may threaten him along with his client. The Supreme Court has
sought to preserve the independence of the lawyer at various stages and in
various ways: in his admission to the bar, in his work before the court, in
proceedings for discipline or for contempt of court, and even in bar organi-
zations. In cases a century apart the Court held that former membership in
rebel or revolutionary organizations could not be made a reason for exclu-
sion from the bar. It protected the ex-Confederate in the 1860s26 as it has
protected the ex-Communist in the 1960s. 27
Three source's of threats to the independence of the lawyer call for men-
tion,-the Judges, the organized bar, and the public.
The Judges. An illustration of protection of the lawyer from the courts
arose out of an indictment of an accused in the District of Columbia for hav-
ing made a false noncommunist affidavit. The lawyer for the accused inquired
23 MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEEs IN LEGAL SERvicEs 209 (1964).
"Ibid.
Wylie v. Cox, 20 U.S. (15 How.) 415 (1853); Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876); Tay-
lor v. Bemis, 110 U.S. 42 (1884).
1Ex parte Barland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
2 t Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1956).
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of those grandjurors who were employees of the federal government about
the influence which their bias or fear induced by the federal loyalty program
had on their action in returning the indictment against the alleged Com-
munist. The district judge found the lawyer guilty of contempt under a stat-
ute which empowered the court so to punish for "misbehavior of any of its
officers in their official transactions". The Supreme Court unanimously re-
versed the judgment of contempt because "a lawyer is not the kind of 'officer'
who can be summarily tried for contempt" under the statute.28 The Court re-
lied in part on the history of the statute which showed it was designed to
limit, not to expand, the power of courts in contempt proceedings. The
Court relied no less on the importance of independence of lawyers, quoting a
fine passage from a Congressional statement:
"The public have almost as deep an interest in the independence of the bar as
of the bench."
In another case a lawyer representing the accused in a Smith Act case
made a public speech during the course of the trial. The trial court suspend-
ed the lawyer from practice for a year. The Supreme Court by a vote of 5 to 4
reversed the suspension.29 The justices were not agreed on what the exact
issue in the case was. It is clear the majority stressed the privilege of the bar to
criticize the courts.
The protection of independence from the court may have an even broader
base. So it was with a state's attorney who had denounced a bench of judges
for inefficiency, laziness and connivance at vice. In a state court he was con-
victed of criminal defamation. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
because of the broad privilege of a citizen to criticize public officials. 30 Mr.
Justice Brennan stated:
".... where the criticism is of public officials and their conduct of public business,
the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest,
secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of truth."
These cases illustrate the protection given to lawyers from the courts in
three sorts of proceedings, for contempt, for discipline, and for criminal libel.
Protection against the organized bar. Over half of the states now have the
integrated bar, a form of bar organization to which all practicing lawyers in
the state must belong. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin after unusually care-
ful consideration of the matter, ordered the integration of the Wisconsin
bar. A member of the bar, filing suit to recover the fifteen dollars annual dues
Is Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956).
9In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959).
30 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
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he had paid under protest, attacked the constitutionality of the integration
order. The Supreme Court of the United States by a vote of 7 to 2 affirmed
the decision of the State court upholding integration. 31 It is exceptionally
difficult to determine what was decided, for there were five opinions-three
for affirmance and two in dissent-and no two opinions went on the same
ground. It is clear that the central concern of the justices was, to quote lan-
guage used in both an affirming and a dissenting opinion, that Wisconsin
lawyers must retain8 2
"full freedom to think their own thoughts, speak their own minds, support
their own causes and wholeheartedly fight whatever they are against."
The asserted danger to the freedom of lawyers was not a real one in the
case, and the dissenters, it would seem, were filing a caveat rather than a dis-
sent. The courts have reserved to themselves power of control over bar mem-
bership. In the bar organization dissenting views may be expressed along
with the views of the majority,33 and the dissenting members of the Court il-
lustrated in the case itself how forcefully minority views on a subject may be
expressed. The advantages that may be gained from a strong bar are real.
Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo before they went on the bench all ex-
pressed their support of a strong professional spirit. It is heartening to note
that the most advanced bar action on group legal services, a matter discussed
earlier, has come from the strongest of the state bars, the integrated bar of
California.3 4
The Public. There is an abiding kind of political and social conflict in-
dicated in academic terms by the observation of a college dean that a normal
student body is not made up entirely of normal students. Every normal so-
ciety has abnormal persons in it, including the lunatic fringes of the left and
of the right. One fringe cries out against everything to the right of left; the
other fringe, much larger in our prosperous country, denounces everything
to the left of right. In our times this abiding conflict has in some nations be-
come social revolution, made vivid for us by Communism, Fascism and Na-
zism, World War II, and the Cold War. Social and political beliefs turned in-
to agitation and then into successful revolutions. They have brought death to
many millions and indirectly they have transformed our national life.
What is the scope of protection under the law of adherents and protago-
nists of such beliefs, who assert the privilege of every American to be a non-
conformist and who demand the protection of the Constitution for them-
" Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961).
MId. at 861, 874.
mId. at 834.
" See note 19 supra.
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selves in their nonconformity? More to our point, what is the duty of the bar
to protect these persons and what protection is to be given to lawyers who
share these beliefs or who defend their adherents?
The recent revolutionary movements and our own unfortunate racial dis-
cord have often commingled clients and their lawyers in common hatred.
The role of the Court in standing firm against repressive political measures
and racial discriminations has become intertwined with its role in preserving
the independence of the bar in defending the hated. My discussion will be
limited to the protection of the bar.
All the members of the Court are in agreement on the importance of the
independence of lawyers. The disagreement within the Court in particular
cases here, as indeed throughout our discussion, comes primarily from differ-
ence of view on two enduring problems as to the Court and the law. One con-
cerns the role of the Constitution and of the Court in our federal system.
Some justices have believed and some still believe the Constitution forbids
any substantial interference with our economic and political systems as the
justices conceive these systems to be. It was so with the Nine Old Men a gen-
eration or more ago in the protection of the economic system they knew. So
it is today with some of the justices in the protection of civil liberties. Other
members of the Court take a more restrained attitude toward their role and
would not substitute their views for those of the Congress or the States unless
the interference is very grave.
A second division of the justices is over whether there should be a weigh-
ing and valuing of competing interests-the balancing process-so that the
values, say, of property rights or of civil liberties, must be weighed in the bal-
ance against other values. The difference in views may come from differences
in temperament that are none the less important because difficult to classify.
Or they may be merely a tactical maneuver in intra-Court controversies, for
a combatant who asserts the uniqueness of his values lifts them above the
battle. Some of the justices seem impatient at the thought of a balancing
process when a preferred interest is in question. Most of them appear to be-
lieve that here as elsewhere in the law the balancing process is essential and
even inevitable. It is indicated by Mr. Justice Cardozo's often quoted phrase,
"the concept of ordered liberty", and by the inscription over the building in
which the Court sits, Equal Justice Under Law. There shall be liberty and
justice, and there shall also be order and law. Chief Justice Warren put the
matter in lasting terms: 35
"It is almost a commonplace to say that free government is on trial for its life...
the members of a free society are called upon to bear an extraordinarily heavy
responsibility, for such a society is based upon the reciprocal self-imposed disci-
Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military; in THE GREAT RIGHTS 89 (Edmond Cahn
ed. 1963).
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pline of both the governed and their government.... the rigorous self-control
that is essential to the maintenance of a proper relation between freedom and
order."
The resistance within the Court to social pressures on the independence of
the bar will be illustrated by cases at two stages, one admission to the bar,
the other contempt and disbarment proceedings.
The first case involved an able and high-minded young man who, after
passing the Illinois bar examination, was denied admission to the bar of the
State. The denial was based on his refusal to answer questions of the Com-
mittee on Character and Fitness on whether he was a member of the Com-
munist Party. He had refused to answer the questions on the libertarian
ground this was a political matter into which the Committee could not in-
quire. The Supreme Court of Illinois upheld the Committee by a margin of
one vote36 and by the same margin the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed the decision.37 The opinions in the case are a study in judicial meth-
od. In the Supreme Court of Illinois, Mr. Justice Schaeffer, dissenting, would
have admitted the candidate, even though he believed the Committee on
Character and Fitness was within its power in asking the questions. The evi-
dence in support of his fitness was overwhelming and, in the view of Mr.
Justice Schaeffer, justice in the particular case should override the rule. In
the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the
majority in affirming the decision of exclusion even though he evidently be-
lieved the exclusion unwise. He upheld the State court because of "the limit-
ed range of our authority" in reviewing State action. Mr. Justice Black dis-
sented in an eloquent and wide ranging opinion in which he insisted on the
importance of independence and courage of the bar.
The second illustration of the protection of independence against social
pressures is given by a controversy over the prosecution of the leaders of the
Communist Party, a controversy which went through the three levels of the
federal courts three times. In the first phase the Court was asked to reverse
the conviction of the accused on the ground that the federal statute under
which they were prosecuted violated their liberties under the Constitution.
By a vote of 6 to 2 the Court upheld the Statute.88 The concern of the justices
is indicated by the number and length of the opinions, three for affirmance
and two in dissent.
In the second phase the Court had before it a summary adjudication of
contempt of court by the counsel for the Communist Party leaders.sa Again
6In re Anastoplo, 18 Ill. 2d 182, 163 N.E. 2d 429 (1960).
87In re Anastoplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
'Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
88a Ironically, the judge who presided at the trial had himself public calumny for defense
of a hated accused some years earlier but had received an appreciative statement from the
Supreme Court for his work in that court. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
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the Court was divided in opinion.39 Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for a ma-
jority of five, showed his realization of the importance of the independence
of the lawyer for an unpopular accused: 40
"We are not unaware or unconcerned that persons identified with unpopular
causes may find it difficult to enlist the counsel of their choice. But that there
may be no misunderstanding, we make clear that the Court, if its aid be needed,
will unhesitatingly protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effective perform-
ance of every duty pertaining to the office of the advocate on behalf of any person
whatsoever .... It will also protect the processes of orderly trial, which is the
supreme object of the lawyer's calling."
The third phase was a motion for disbarment in the Federal District Court
of the principal counsel of the Communist leaders. The motion for disbar-
ment was granted by the District Court, but the Supreme Court, with two
justices dissenting, reversed the decision on the ground that permanent dis-
barment was "unnecessarily severe". 41 The most enlightening thing in the
case is the brief filed on behalf of the counsel. Granting as it did that the con-
duct of counsel in the trial of the Communist leaders was not justified, the
brief in its conclusion placed the plea for reversal on the broad ground of
prevention of any hazard to counsel who represent the hated: 42
"It is, indeed, a matter of common knowledge that the frequent unavailability
of counsel to represent individuals accused of unlawful subversive activities or
connections has increasingly aroused concern among bar associations and leading
jurists, including members of this Court.... And if this punishment of wholly
exceptional severity is now allowed to stand, the consequence must be to mag-
nify contemporary hazards to the integrity and dispassionateness of the American
bar."
We can be certain the whole Court shared the concern.
THE CONDUCT OF LAWYERS AT WORK
The administration of law through the adversary system involves a paradox.
Admittedly, it is a function of government with this aspect of its character
made visible through the presence of a public official, the judge. Yet the most
I Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
4 Id. at 13, 14.
"I Sacher v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954).
"Brief for Petitioner, p. 43, Sacher v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 347
U.S. 388 (1954).
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influential participants in this public function are private persons, the law-
yers. The lawyers are privately retained and paid, they are partisan represent-
atives of one side alone, and their independence is protected, as we have
seen, even from the judge himself. The dominant position of lawyers in court
proceedings in this country was indicated by Mr. Joseph Choate in a com-
parison drawn in a speech to the English bench and bar: 48
"In American we say that the counsel try the case and that the judge hears and
decides; but, if I understand your common parlance here, the judge tries the
case and the counsel hear and obey."
The adversary system in law administration has its parallel in our competi-
tive economic system. The most fundamental needs of our society, food and
clothing and shelter, are supplied by persons striving competitively for prof-
it. The competitive economic system would destroy itself if its excesses were
not limited in the public interest. So it is hedged about by a host of regula-
tions, many imposed by statute and some developed by the courts.
What regulations of the competitive system in the administration of law
has the Supreme Court developed? The importance of the Court's attitude
in this matter is indicated by an English lawyer writing on law reform in the
Nineteenth Century, a century notable for the sweep of statutory change. Yet
he could say there was something still greater:44
"Of all the mighty changes that have taken place in the nineteenth century, the
greatest change has been in the tone of the administration of both the civil and
the criminal law. The manners of our law courts have marvelously improved."
This mightiest change he attributed most of all to the judges.
Three matters will be mentioned here, loyalty, then the almost indivisible
complex of candor and fairness and manners, and lastly costs.
Loyalty. The court is insistent that a lawyer's sense of loyalty to his client
shall be personal and direct and shall not be impaired by conflicting interests.
In criminal cases it has written this standard of the bar into the constitution-
al guarantee of the right to counsel. In the first of the leading cases on the
subject the state judge had assigned the whole bar of the little town to repre-
sent the defendants charged with rape. The Court held such a designation
did not satisfy the right to counsel for45
"... they would not, thus collectively named, have been given that clear appreci-
ation of responsibility or impressed with that individual sense of duty which
" See The Earl Jowitt, THE STRANGE CASE OF ALGER Hiss 6 (1953).
" OVGERs, A CENTURY OF LAw REFORM 41-42 (1901).
'5Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a selected member
of the bar, specifically named and assigned."
In a federal court case, the conviction of an accused was set aside on consti-
tutional grounds because his counsel had been appointed by the court to
represent in the same trial another defendant whose interests were not iden-
tical.46 In reorganization proceedings the old evil of conflicting interests has
been repeatedly condemned.47
This insistence on unimpaired loyalty is especially important now. New
methods of group practice will soon develop, encouraged as they are by the
Button and Brotherhood cases. 48 The most pervasive and insidious threat to
effective services under those methods comes from the lack of a sense of per-
sonal relationship and the danger of conflicting interests.
Unimpaired loyalty on which the Court so wisely insists is not a modifica-
tion of the adversary system. Rather, it is an insistence on the maintenance
of its chief characteristic, a partisan representative who owes loyalty to one
side alone. Are there nevertheless some limitations on what loyalty and zeal
may induce?
Frankness, Fairness, Manners. The decision of even an appellate case, does
not involve the matching of dry and clear facts with precise rules of law to
reach an inexorable result. Rather the facts are frequently fuzzy, the law is
often deliberately vague ("due process of law" is an example), and the val-
ues and emotions of the tribunal stirred by the arguments of counsel are the
moving force in the decisions. Frankness, fairness and even manners by coun-
sel will not be forthcoming from lawyers unless the courts require them.
The partisan adversary system encourages the lawyer on each side to em-
ploy the advantages of concealment. At least the tribunal, when asked to en-
ter an order, should not be deceived as to the substantial issue and the plans
of counsel. So in a liquidation controversy between two groups of stock-
holders concealment of the plan to use a delay requested from a state court
for the purpose of filing a parallel proceeding in the federal court was reason
enough for the Supreme Court to upset the federal court receivership. 49 In a
railroad reorganization case Mr. Justice Stone spoke for Justices Holmes and
Brandeis, too, when in a dissenting opinion he denounced the failure of
counsel to disclose to the Interstate Commerce Commission their intention
to attack in court a portion of the reorganization order they sought and se-
cured from the commission.50
"Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60 (1942).
41 An illustration is Woods v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262 (1941).
' See notes 5 and 6 supra.
Harkin v. Brundage, 276 U.S. 36 (1928).
5 United States v. Chicago, Mil., St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 282 U.S. 311 (1931).
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For the revealing of evidence in the federal courts the Court has left the
parties to the wide opportunities given by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Stating that the rules are "to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment"
Mr. Justice Murphy continued: 51
"Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential
to proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession."
In another case the Court upheld an order of the Commissioner of Patents
disbarring a lawyer from practice before the Patent Office because in a patent
contest he had submitted as written by a disinterested labor leader an article
which he knew had been prepared by an employee of his client.5 2
In criminal cases the Court has gone much farther in the requirement of
frankness, as two cases the same year show. The Mooney case, holding that it
would be a denial of due process for the state's attorney knowingly to use
perjured evidence, stressed the constitutional requirement of frankness in
the state courts.53 Mr. Justice Sutherland, in reversing a conviction for mis-
conduct by the prosecutor, stated the standard in the federal courts in often-
quoted language: 54
"The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to
a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done."
Yet disclosure by the prosecution, whether as an affirmative duty on the
prosecutor or a privilege of the accused to require, seemingly has not been
developed as far by the Supreme Court of the United States as it has been in
at least one state, California. 55 Nor has the requirement of disclosure of some
matters by the accused been so employed. 56
Even in the matter of citation of the relevant authorities the Supreme
Court of the United States does not appear to have gone as far as the House
51 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U.S. 318 (1949).
Is Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
51Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
55 See Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. REB. 228
(1964).
w' See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P. 2d 919 (1962). The whole field of dis-
closure in the federal courts is now under review by the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Wright, Proposed Changes in
Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, 31 TENN. L. REv. 417 (1964).
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of Lords in its insistence on frankness by counsel. The position of that court
was stated a generation ago:5 7
"Their Lordships are therefore very much in the hands of counsel, and those
who instruct in these matters, and it is the practice of the house to expect, and
indeed to insist, that authorities that bear one way or the other upon matters
under debate should be brought to the attention of their Lordships, by those
who are aware of those authorities. That observation is irrespective of whether
or not the particular authority assists the party who is aware of it. It is an obli-
gation of confidence between their Lordships and all those who assist in the
debates in this house in the capacity of counsel."
The court is now active in the reconsideration of the notable rules of pro-
cedure for the federal courts. This month the Chief Justice announced that
it would begin the consideration of Uniform Rules of Evidence for the Unit-
ed States District Court through the accustomed method of the appointment
of a nationwide committee to formulate proposed rules for submission to the
Court. Perhaps, through the rules or through independent action by the
Court, there will be insistence on a greater measure of frankness at the trial
and the appellate levels.
The importance of values and emotions in reaching a decision could be
illustrated by almost any of the cases here discussed. The justices of the Su-
preme Court often reach their judgments with a strength of feeling they do
not seek to conceal. If it is so in their secluded place, how much more is it so
in the trial court with the lay tribunal, the jurymen. The lawyer surely does
not neglect this decisive element.
"The symbol of justice as it is actually administered is not the goddess disinter-
ested and infallible, holding the scales, but rather the Gaul who throws his sword
into the balance."58
What limitations are there on the lawyer in the emotions he throws into the
balance? May he appeal to every emotion that might stir the tribunal?
Here the Supreme Court has done something. justice Stone wrote for a
unanimous court when a decision for damages against a railroad company
was reversed because of the appeal at the trial to class and sectional preju-
dice: 59
"The public interest requires that the trial court of its own motion, as is its
57Lord Birkenhead, L. C., in Glebe Sugar Refining Co., Ltd. v. Trustees of Port and Har-
bours of Greenock, 125 L. T. 578, 579, 37 T. L. R. 436 (1921).Is Lepaulle, The Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARV. L. REV. 838, 845 (1922).
51 New York Cent. R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U. S. 310 (1929)
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power and duty, protect suitors in their right to a verdict uninfluenced by the
appeals of counsel to passion or prejudice."
On the whole, however, the Court has done very little. The cases already
discussed that involved the unpopular may indicate that.the appeal by coun-
sel to emotions will be condemned when it is directed to emotions which our
ideals seek to allay rather than to inflame, or when it is directed against per-
sons under a special disadvantage, as, a minority group or enemies in war
time.
"Manners maketh man", the old motto of William of Wykeham, is the
central idea of an essay by an outstanding judge on what he called the three
great domains of human action: Positive Law, Free Choice, Obedience to
the Unenforceable. 60 "Obedience to the Unenforceable", the third domain is
the author's foreword of the leading work on Legal Ethics.61 Yet when the
temptations of the adversary system lead the partisan representative to vitu-
peration of his opponent, the Supreme Court has not left the matter to the
unenforceable. In a series of cases62 the Court moved on from striking the
brief of counsel from the files, to animadversion upon his bad temper and
recklessness, and to suspension from the bar of the Court, saying: 63
"We insist that arguments in this Court, either oral or written, though often
properly in sharp controversy, shall be gracious and respectful to both the Court
and opposing counsel and be in such words as may be properly addressed by
one gentleman to another."
Candor and fairness and manners, without sacrifice of vigor and effective-
ness, can be attained by lawyers. Their attainment is best illustrated by the
Solicitor General of the United States and his staff. The sense of professional
responsibility shown by this office has long set a standard that the Supreme
Court could do more to encourage in all lawyers in their work.
Costs. The risk and burden of costs, like the availability of counsel, affect
the willingness of persons to litigate and the consequent amount of litiga-
tion. On this matter there is a sharp contrast between the systems in Eng-
land and the United States. In England the losing party pays the reasonable
litigation expenses of his adversary as well as his own. In this country the
costs that the defeated party pays beyond his own expenses include ordinarily
only the insignificant charges of the tribunal. In a case at the present term
Lord Moulton, "Law and Manners", The Atlantic Monthly, July, 1924, p. 1.
""'"True civilization is measured by the extent of Obedience to the Unenforceable." Lord
Moulton, quoted in DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 2 (1953).
65 Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); National Surety Co. v. Jarvis, 278 U. S.
610 (1928); In the Matter of Thomas Marshall, 55 S. Ct. 344, 513 (1935)
6 National Surety Co. v. Jarvis, id. at 611.
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the Court deal with the power of a district court under the words of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54 (d) "costs shall be allowed as of course
to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs". The plaintiff, who
had filed suit in New York against an oil company operating in Saudi Ara-
bia had a verdict against him at a first and at a second trial. After the plain-
tiff's defeat at the first trial the judge approved the clerk's taxation of costs
against him in the amount of over $6,000. On his defeat the second time, the
clerk taxed against the plaintiff nearly $12,000 as costs for both trials, con-
sisting principally of the transportation expenses of defendant's witnesses
brought from Saudi Arabia and the costs of overnight trial transcripts. On
review the second judge reduced this "staggering" bill to about $800. The
Supreme Court upheld the order of the second judge in its entirety.64 In affirm-
ing the existence of power in the trial court Mr. Justice Black stated that the
words of the Rule
"quite plainly vest some power in the court to allow some 'costs'."
But he insised the discretion to tax costs should be "sparingly" exercised
in harmony with our national policy of reducing insofar as possible the bur-
densome cost of litigation:
"Any other practice would be too great a movement in the direction of some
systems of jurisprudence, that are willing, if not indeed anxious, to allow litiga-
tion costs so high as to discourage litigants from bringing lawsuits, ... "
It is a fair question whether the heavy emphasis in this country on litiga-
tion is socially desirable; or whether as in England litigation should be dis-
couraged; or whether there is a wiser middle way which encourages concilia-
tion and fair settlement. There is no doubt that the narrow interpretation
given by the Court to the vague Federal Rule on the charging of costs is in
accord with our past professional policy.
PUBLIC LEADERSHIP
"No tradition of our profession is more cherished by lawyers than that of its
leadership in public affairs .... The great figures of the law stir the imagination
and inspire our reverence according as they have used their special training and
gifts for the advancement of the public interest." 65
In making the notable University of Michigan address from which this
" Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227 (1964).
" Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV L. REv. 1 (1934).
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passage is taken Justice Stone was mindful of the fact that the members of
the bar conspicuous in prestige among their fellows are not serving in politi-
cal office now in the same measure as of old. He had in mind not merely po-
litical activities and office holding, however important these may be because
of the opportunities for usefulness they bring. He directed himself to leader-
ship in thought and plans and action throughout the wide areas of public
responsibility. He urged that lawyers seize the varied opportunities for pub-
lic leadership open before them in our time, some of which may usefully be
mentioned here.
The legislative and executive branches of the governments of the nation,
the states and the municipalities continue to be dominated by lawyers. There
are other areas of our community life that are no less public even though not
political, in which lawyers who do not desire political office or would be un-
acceptable to the electorate can, and do, contribute much to public life.
These areas include the schools, the charities and the cultural institutions.
Closer to our professional work are the activities of the numerous organiza-
tions directed to the improvement of the law and of law administration. 66
Most important of all is the formation of public opinion. This function of
lawyers in our democracy goes back to the beginning of our government
when Hamilton and Jay along with Madison wrote the Federalist Papers. It
continues today when lawyers defend unpopular clients in court or uphold
their right to be heard. Surely public leadership by lawyers is as important
now as ever when swiftly changing conditions call for rapid yet wise develop-
ment in our institutions.
These matters of public leadership rarely get into the cases. Occasionally
they appear in the opinions. In the case already discussed involving the de-
nial of admission of a libertarian nonconformist to the bar of Illinois, Mr.
Justice Black lauded illustrations of independence before the courts and the
public in a passage that is worth remembering: 67
"It is such men as these who have most greatly honored the profession of the law
-men like Malsherbes, who, at the cost of his own life and the lives of his family,
sprang unafraid to the defense of Louis XIV against the fanatical leaders of the
Revolutionary government of France-men like Charles Evans Hughes, Sr., later
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who stood up for the constitutional rights of socialists
to be socialists and public officials despite the threat and clamorous protests of
self-proclaimed superpatriots-men like Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and John W.
Davis, who, while against everything for which the Communists stood, strongly
The members of the Court have lent their moral support to such organizations as The
Legal Aid Society, The American Law Institute, The American Judicature Society, and sec-
tions of the American Bar Association. The Court has drawn directly on the bar for aid in
its own constant efforts to improve law administration.
67 In re Anastoplo, 366 U.S. 82, .114-116 (1961).
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advised the Congress in 1948 that it would be unconstitutional to pass the law
then proposed to outlaw the Communist Party-men like Lord Erskine, James
Otis, Clarence Darrow, and the multitude of others who have dared to speak
in defense of causes and clients without regard to personal danger to themselves.
The legal profession will lose much of its nobility and its glory if it is not con-
stantly replenished with lawyers like these."
Almost a century earlier there came before the Court an Arkansas lawyer
who, after the secession of his state, had served in the Congress of the Con-
federate States. On receiving a pardon by the President, he sought permission
to resume practice before the Supreme Court of the United States. He was
halted by an Act of Congress which provided that anyone who sought to
practice in the federal courts must take an oath that he had never held office
"under any pretended government in hostility of the United States". The
Court by a margin of one vote struck down the act as in violation of the con-
situational prohibitions against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. Mr.
Justice Miller in the dissenting opinion made vivid for his times and also for
our own the influence of lawyers on public opinion:6 8
"... the members of the legal profession have been powerful for good or evil to
the government. They are, by the nature of their duties, the moulders of public
sentiment on questions of government.... I venture to affirm, that if all the mem-
bers of the legal profession in the States lately in insurrection had possessed the
qualification of a loyal and faithful allegiance to the government, we should
have been spared the horrors of that Rebellion."
CONCLUSION
A discussion of the influence of courts on the American bar may be mislead-
ing and even unfair when it treats of the Supreme Court of the United States
alone. It is the so called lower Federal courts and the State courts, with many
members of no less distinction than their titular superiors, which will con-
tinue to do most to set the standards of lawyers.
Yet the Supreme Court of the United States does have unique responsi-
bility and power under the Constitution to prescribe requirements of fair-
ness for agencies of government throughout the nation, as well as special
control over the federal courts. Our brief discussion reveals even though
dimly the image of the American lawyer held by the Court and the consequent
professional values which it has written into its judgments and so into the
61Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 386 (1866). For our times see, Fraenkel, The
Alabama Lawyer, 1954-64: Has the Official Organ Atrophied?, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1243 (1964);
Contrast MORGAN, A TIME To SPEAK (1964).
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Constitution. The services of a lawyer should be available in fact to those
who need them and professional limitations that stand in the way must be
swept aside. The lawyer will be courageous and loyal in his client's behalf,
and threat to his independence will be struck down. He will be zealous in
partisan advocacy, yet the conditions of practice should encourage the de-
velopment of the full facts before the tribunal. Hopefully, the American
lawyer will continue to provide in varied ways the responsible public leader-
ship that has marked him in the past and that is so needed in our times.
There is at least an intimation by some of the justices of another set of
developments ahead. The Constitution in the Preamble states as its first pur-
pose, "in order to form a more perfect Union". The principal imperfection
of the earlier Union under the Articles of Confederation was the lack of
limitation on the centrifugal forces of the several states. These forces, checked
by war a century ago, are in their continuing minor manifestations now
checked by the Court.
Another set of centrifugal forces has developed out of the diverse compo-
nents of our national society. Each of the terms, big business, big labor, big
profession, covers a variety of diverse elements. Every one of these elements
naturally sees and seeks its own advantage, and for the general good it must
be restrained and also coordinated with the other elements. Under the Sher-
man Act and its successors the Supreme Court has been given much control
over business. Under the National Labor Relations Act and its successors it
has received some power as to organized labor. In the expansive provisions
of the Constitution the Supreme Court of the United States may find a like
power as to the professions, especially the profession of which it is a part, the
profession of law.6 9
10 See NAACP v. Button, note 3 supra; Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, note 4
supra. See also Rutledge, Law and Lawyers in the Modern World, Surey of the Conference
Problems, 15, U. CINc. L. Rv. 237, 238 (1941).
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